# Effective Belief Network for Cyber Security Frameworks

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**Abstract**— Cyber security frameworks are considered high level guidance for cyber security solutions. Managing the implementation of cyber security frameworks is a difficult task due to various cyber security issues related to framework interdependent components (variables). Various works identifies these variables, but it does not show their relationships. In order to reduce potential threats at an early phase in cyber security framework implementation, a clear understanding of the relationship between these variables is desired. This article proposes a causal cyber security belief network in order to facilitate frameworks execution. The resultant belief network shows that cyber security objectives are achievable with theoretical minimum threats.

*Keywords*- Cyber Security Implementation Frameworks, Belief Networks, Cyber security strategy.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

MPLEMENTING cyber security is challenging for every country [1]. It is related to many factors; software, hardware, technology, people and business procedures [2]. Cyber security frameworks must provide guidance to management at various levels before framework implementation [3]. To help managers, models must be comprehensive and abstract to cover as much as possible of related aspects of cyber security solutions. Atoum *et al.* [3] proposed a holistic cyber security implementation framework in order to holistically resolve management issues.

Figure 1 shows Atoum *et al.* model. The model is holistic (abstractly at the national level). A close look at the figure shows many components: Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) and its goals, the audit and Change Control Board, the business needs etc. Atoum *et al.* [3] showed that the model can basically convert the CSS to goals and then goals can be converted to detailed security requirements. As a result, the requirements is carried out using various security projects. The results of these projects contribute to cyber security goals of the cyber security framework. However, the model does not show how its components are related. Consequently, managing this model will need higher management, especially risk and security managers to take care of various components (aspects) at the same time.

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


Fig. 1 HCS-IF (from Atoum et al. (2012)

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Several models were proposed to identify and analyze risks and potential threats of cyber security models [4]–[6]. However, these models are run on real-time or near real-time. Therefore, most actions are preventive not proactive. Hence, this article proposes a model using belief networks in order to help security managers oversee cyber security model potential risks at early phase of cyber security execution. Consequently, improving decision making for security investment. The article will be based on the work of Atoum *et al.* [3] as it represent security frameworks holistically. The proposed model analyses and quantifies information security risks caused by several threat resources (components).

First, we introduce Bayes Networks. Then, we provide an example on belief networks. Finally, we use belief networks to describe cyber security implementation frameworks.

# II. BAYESIAN NETWORK

A Bayesian Network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random variables and their conditional dependencies via a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to reason about uncertainty.


The simplest form of the Bayes Theorem (formula (1)):

 $P(A \cap B) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A)P(A),$ 

(1)

where:

#### **A** and **B** are any random events,



## $P(B) \neq 0$ .

This formula is read as: Probability of A and B = (Probability of A given B) TIMES (Probability of B)

The Bayes Chain product rule for n variables is defined as in (formula (2)):

$$P(\bigcap_{k=1}^{n} A_{k}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} P(A_{k} | \bigcap_{j=1}^{k-1} A_{j}),$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

where:

A<sub>k</sub> is any random variable k,

**n** is number of random variables,

 $\bigcap_{k=1}^{n} A_{k}$  list of random variables.

As an example ,applying formula (2) for 4 variables for example we got:

$$P(A_4, A_3, A_2, A_1) = P(A_4 | A_3, A_2, A_1) \cdot P(A_3 | A_2, A_1) \cdot P(A_2 | A_1) \cdot P(A_1)$$
(3)

To illustrate the BN in an example, suppose that there are two events that could cause a system to be unsecured (S): either the security policy (L) is not enforced or a system failure (F). Also, suppose that the policy has a direct effect on a system being failure. Then the situation can be modelled with a Bayesian Network. All three variables have two possible values, Y (for Yes) and N (for No). See Figures (Figure 2 to Figure 4). The model can answer questions like: "What is the probability that a system policy is not enforced, given the system is unsecured?" by using the conditional probability




Fig. 3 Belief Network Example After an Evidence Is Set (S=N)is Set.

formulas (1), and chain product rule (2):

$$P(L = N | S = N) = \frac{P(S = N, L = N)}{P(S = N)}$$
$$= \frac{\sum_{F \in \{N,Y\}} P(S = N, L = N, F)}{\sum_{L,F \in \{N,Y\}} P(S = N, L, F)}$$

$$=\frac{0.9*0.1*0.05+0.05*0.1*0.95}{0.9*0.1*0.05+0.01*0.9*0.99+0.8*0.9*0.01}$$

 $=\frac{0.0045 + 0.00475}{0.0045 + 0.00475 + 0.00891 + 0.0072}$ 

≅ 0.36

=

The joint probability will become more difficult to calculate manually especially if the number of variables increases and the number of states increases, so software tools are usually used. Many software tools have set of algorithms that could be used to calculate the probabilities especially for large networks. In this research, we use the GeNIe [7].

#### III. RELATED WORK

Bayesian Network techniques have been applied to cyber security domains. They are used to intrusion detection systems [8]–[10]. BN is also used for attack graphs at run time [11], [12]. BN has been using to measure and evaluate the security level during system execution [13]

Literature discussed several models to analyze security models by making causal relationship between vulnerabilities and exploits [14]–[16]. Their approaches are based in building attack graphs to show several stages attacks of the enterprise network. [17] proposed BN model to analyze potential threats of enterprise networks by exploiting data of intrusion response.

To our knowledge there is no work related to cyber security frameworks using belief networks. However, the model of Kondakci [18] could be near to our work. Kondakci proposed a model to assess risk of enterprise networks using BN. There model is based on pre-calculated probabilities. Most of studied models showed that BN are used based on existing data in real-time however, our approach is at design time.

## IV. PROPOSED MODEL

We use the BN to formally validate the ability of the Holistic Cyber Security Implementation Framework of [3] (H-CS-IF) to achieve the required security level utilizing a set of controls that have an effect on each other. Figure 5 is the Bayesian belief network model for the HCS-IF using GeNIe.

In the HCS-IF, the supportive evidence values toward cyber security objectives are mainly: the Controls, the Strategic Moves, the Requirements, Identified Goals and the CSS. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is no direct way to calculate the probability of each component. So, we depend on domain knowledge and expert expectation. Other works such as Trust-Based Security Level Evaluation using Bayesian can be used to integrate both domain expert and knowledge base [13].




Figure 5 Belief Network of HCS-IF.

Consequently, BN enables the HCS-IF to lend itself to this suggested validation approach (i.e. BN). The more related components we identify the more accurate the measured security level. As a result, the HCS-IF can give direction in order to guarantee the achievement of the required security level by achieving security objectives.

# V. EVALUATION

To illustrate the model shown in Figure 5, we make 2 runs, the first with feedback from experts and the result is shown in Figure 6. The latter run is shown in Figure 7 by making evidence that Business, Framework, Audit, Governance, Strategic Controls are not satisfied. We got a security level of 88% in the first case compared to a

security level of only 28% in the second case. Which means the evidence variables have direct effect on the ultimate security level.

A further step has been carried out in order to test the proposed BN; we created 10,000 records of the network with a probability of 50% for each variable. Then, we test the network shown in Figure 6 using: the generated data, 10-fold cross validation. The result was 68% for the security objectives success which relatively provides a good indication for the BN model validity.

Unfortunately, we have noticed that the results are highly dependent on the generated data and its distribution. Since we are not able to get data to our model due to fact that most available data sets are on the operational level of cyber security, and even if we were able to aggregate such data the semantic of the data will get lost. Therefore, the proposed BN is able to give direction to the security managers at early stage of the cyber security implementation.




Fig. 6 Sample Network of HCS-IF (Assigning Values by Experts).




Fig. 7 Sample Network of HCS-IF (Assigning Evidence of Controls to False).

## VI. CONCLUSION

This article proposed a new way to model cyber security frameworks in terms of its variables. We model a previously proposed cyber security model using belief networks. The proposed model shows the causal effect between cyber security framework components (variables). The proposed model was tested on random data and on data provided by the experts. Results showed that the proposed model is applicable and give guidance to security engineers.

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