

An Improved User Authentication Scheme for Hierarchical Wireless Sensor Networks without Tamper-Proof Smart Card

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Abstract—Recently, Maitra et al. proposed an efficient and robust user authentication scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks. They claimed that their scheme does not need tamper-proof smart card and resisted different possible attacks include smart card stolen attack, impersonation attack, privileged insider attack, replay attack, off-line password guessing attack, theft attack, session key recovery attack, denial of service attack, and cluster head capture attack. However, we find some weaknesses of his scheme in this article. We show that their scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack.

Keywords-password; smart card; tamper-proof; user authentication; wireless sensor networks;

I. INTRODUCTION

Remote user authentication is the mechanism that widely uses to identify the legitimate user in Internet [8], [12], [21], [27], [28]. Conventional remote user authentication schemes are suited to identify the remote users for single server environment of client/server architecture [2], [7], [17], [20], [24], [26]. However, the use of Internet has grown spectacularly. More and more users need services in different servers. In other word, the users in the network architecture are become in multi-server environment [4], [6], [10], [15]. In conventional user authentication schemes, users not only need to login to various servers with repetitive registration, but also need to remember the various user ID (identities) and passwords [3], [5], [9], [11].

In 2012, Ramasamy et al. proposed a user authentication scheme for smart cards [19]. However, Thandra et al. showed that their scheme is insecure [22]. In 2016, Thandra et al. also proposed a secure and efficient user authentication scheme [22]. However, Pan et al. shown that their scheme is vulnerable to denial of service, online and offline password guessing, and user impersonation attacks [18]. In 2016, Wei et al. proposed a user authentication scheme [25].

However, Tsai et al. shown that their scheme is vulnerable to denial of service, password guessing, and privileged insider attacks [23]. Recently, Liu et al. proposed an efficient user authentication scheme with a smart card [14]. However, Liu et al. shown that their scheme was vulnerable to the replaying attack [13].

Recently, Maitra et al. proposed an efficient and robust user authentication scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks [16]. They claimed that their scheme does not need tamper-proof smart card and resisted different possible attacks include smart card stolen attack, impersonation attack, privileged insider attack, replay attack, off-line password guessing attack, theft attack, session key recovery attack, denial of service attack, and cluster head capture attack. However, we find some weaknesses of his scheme in this article. We show that their scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack and off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Maitra et al.'s remote user authentication scheme. In Section 3, we analyze and show that some security flaws exist in Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 4.

II. REVIEW OF MAITRA ET AL.'S SCHEME

In this section, we briefly review Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks without tamper-proof smart card [16]. There are four participants in Maitra et al.'s remote user authentication scheme: users ($U_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, m$ for short); Card reader (CR for short); Base stations (BS for short) and cluster head ($CH_j, j = 1, 2, \dots, n$ for short). The scheme consists of four phases, namely the registration phase, the login phase, the authentication phase, and the password change phase. The notations used in this article are listed in Table ??.

Table I
 LIST OF NOTATION USED

Symbol	Description
U_i	i -th User
BS	Base station
SN_j	Sensor node j
CH_j	Cluster head j in the j -th cluster
pw_i	Password of user U_i
ID_i	Identity of user U_i
ID_{CH_j}	Identity of cluster head CH_j
ID_{SN_j}	Identity of sensor node SN_j
S_{CH_j}	Shared secret key between CH_j and BS
S_{SN_j}	Shared secret key between SN_j and BS
MK_{CH_j}	Unique shared master key randomly generated by the BS for CH_j
SK	Shared session key between U_i and CH_j
$h(\cdot)$	Cryptographic One-way hash function
E	Symmetric key encryption algorithm
D	Symmetric key decryption algorithm
s	Secret information of the base station
X_A	Shared secret between U_i and BS
T	Current time stamp
\parallel	Concatenation operation
\oplus	Bit wise XOR operation

A. The Registration Phase

In the registration phase, the base station BS makes a smart card for a new user (U_i). The registration phase is executed as follows:

- 1) The new user U_i firstly chooses a random number y_i , his/her identity ID_i and password pw_i .
- 2) U_i computes $pw'_i = h(pw_i \parallel y_i)$ and sends $\{ID_i, pw'_i\}$ to the base station BS through a secure channel.
- 3) After getting message $\{ID_i, pw'_i\}$ from the user U_i , base station computes $X_i = h(ID_i \parallel s) \oplus pw'_i$ and $B_i = h(h(ID_i \parallel s) \parallel pw'_i)$.
- 4) The base station issues a smart card for user U_i by storing $\{X_i, B_i, h(\cdot)\}$ into the memory of smart card.
- 5) After getting his/her smart card, user U_i stores y_i into the memory of smart card.

B. The Login Phase

In this phase, the user (U_i) wants to login to the base station BS_j for obtaining some services, the user (U_i) firstly attaches his/her smart card to a device reader and inputs his/her identity ID'_i and password PW'_i . The login phase is executed in the following:

- 1) Then card reader computes

$$\begin{aligned} pw'_i &= h(pw_i \parallel y_i), \\ Y'_i &= X_i \oplus pw'_i, \\ B'_i &= h(Y'_i \parallel pw'_i), \end{aligned}$$

and checks whether computed B'_i equals stored B_i . If true, proceed to next otherwise 'rejects' user U_i .

Then, user U_i chooses ID_{CH_j} and submits it to the card reader.

- 2) The card reader further chooses a random number N_1 and computes

$$\begin{aligned} P_i &= h(Y'_i \parallel ID_{CH_j} \parallel N_1 \parallel pw'_i) \\ R_i &= N_1 \oplus pw'_i, \end{aligned}$$

and sends $\{ID_i, ID_{CH_j}, P_i, R_i, X_i\}$ to the base station.

C. The Authentication Phase

Upon receiving the authentication request message $\{ID_i, ID_{CH_j}, P_i, R_i, X_i\}$ from user U_i , the base station BS executes this authentication phase in the following:

- 1) The base station computes

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i^* &= h(ID_i \parallel s), \\ pw_i^* &= Y_i^* \oplus X_i, \\ N_1^* &= pw_i^* \oplus R_i \\ P_i^* &= h(Y_i^* \parallel ID_{CH_j} \parallel N_1^* \parallel pw_i^*). \end{aligned}$$

- 2) BS checks whether computed P_i^* equals sending P_i or not. If it holds good, base station further chooses a random number N_2 and computes

$$\begin{aligned} Z_i &= pw_i^* \oplus N_2, \\ D_i &= h(Y_i^* \parallel N_2 \parallel ID_{CH_j} \parallel ID_i \parallel N_1^*). \end{aligned}$$

- 3) BS sends $\{ID_i, ID_{CH_j}, Z_i, D_i\}$ to the user U_i . Again base station computes

$$\begin{aligned} N_3 &= N_2 \oplus N_1^*, \\ V_i &= h(ID_{CH_j} \parallel S_{CH_j}), \\ E_i &= V_i \oplus N_3, \\ A_i &= h(Y_i^* \parallel N_3 \parallel pw_i^*), \\ L_i &= A_i \oplus V_i \\ G_i &= h(S_{CH_j} \parallel N_3 \parallel A_i \parallel ID_i \parallel ID_{CH_j}) \end{aligned}$$

- 4) BS sends $\{E_i, L_i, G_i, ID_i, ID_{CH_j}\}$ to the cluster head CH_j . After that the following computations are performed:

- a) After getting reply message $\{ID_i, ID_{CH_j}, Z_i, D_i\}$ from base station, card reader computes $N'_2 = Z_i \oplus pw'_i$, $D'_i = h(Y'_i \parallel N'_2 \parallel ID_{CH_j} \parallel ID_i \parallel N_1)$ and checks whether computed D'_i equals sending D_i or not. If it holds good then computes $N'_3 = N_1 \oplus N'_2$, $A'_i = h(Y'_i \parallel N'_3 \parallel pw'_i)$ and session key $SK = h(ID_i \parallel ID_{CH_j} \parallel N'_3 \parallel A'_i)$.

- b) After receiving message $\{E_i, L_i, G_i, ID_i, ID_{CH_j}\}$ from base station, cluster head CH_j computes $V_i^* = h(ID_{CH_j} \parallel S_{CH_j})$, $N_3^* = V_i^* \oplus E_i$, $A_i^* = L_i \oplus V_i^*$ and $G_i^* = h(S_{CH_j} \parallel N_3^* \parallel A_i^* \parallel ID_i \parallel ID_{CH_j})$

and checks whether computed G_i^* equals sending G_i or not. If true, then it computes session key $SK = h(ID_i || ID_{CH_j} || N_3^* || A_i^*)$.

Now, both parties (user U_i and cluster head CH_j) are agreed with common shared session key SK and can communicate securely to each other by shared secret session key SK in future.

III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF MAITRA ET AL.'S SCHEME

In this section, we will analyze Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks without tamper-proof smart card [16]. Maitra et al. claimed that their scheme is resisted different possible attacks include smart card stolen attack, impersonation attack, privileged insider attack, replay attack, off-line password guessing attack, theft attack, session key recovery attack, denial of service attack, and cluster head capture attack. In this section, we show that Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack.

A. Off-line Password Guessing with Smart Card Stolen Attack

Maitra et al. claimed that an attacker is hard to derive user's password PW_i if the attacker gets the user's smart card and a login message $\{ID_i, ID_{CH_j}, P_i, R_i, X_i\}$ between the user U_i and base station BS . In this section, we will show that Maitra et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack.

The attacker is able to intercept from the public channel. Thus the attacker obtains a login message $\{ID_i, ID_{CH_j}, P_i, R_i, X_i\}$ between the user U_i and base station BS . The attacker may guess the user's password PW_i as follows.

- 1) The attacker guesses the user's password PW'_i .
- 2) The smart card computes pwr'_i as follows:

$$pwr'_i = h(PW'_i || y_i),$$

here y_i is obtained from the smart card.

- 3) The smart card computes Y'_i and N'_1 as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Y'_i &= X_i \oplus pwr'_i, \\ N'_1 &= R_i \oplus pwr'_i. \end{aligned}$$

Here, X_i and R_i are intercepted from the last login message between the smart card and base station.

- 4) The attacker computes P'_i as follows:

$$P'_i = h(Y'_i || ID_{CH_j} || N'_1 || pwr'_i).$$

Next the attacker checks if P'_i is or not equal to P_i , here P_i is intercepted from the last login message between the smart card and base station. If it's hold, the guessed password is correct, otherwise, the attacker

guess other password and checks it again as the above steps.

The attacker could repeat the above step to re-guess the other password. If it is true, this implies which the guessing password PW'_i is correct. Therefore, Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack.

B. The improvement of Maitra et al.'s Scheme

The main weakness of Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme is that the attacker could repeat to guess the password with smart card. To improve the weakness of Maitra et al.'s scheme, the smart card in this scheme should set up the timer. If the user input the incorrect password 3 times, the smart card must initial the registration of the user.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have reviewed Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks without tamper-proof smart card [16] and cryptanalyzed its security. Because the user password is chosen by easy to remember, we showed that Maitra et al.'s user authentication scheme cannot withstand the off-line password guessing with smart card stolen attack. We also propose an improvement of Maitra et al.'s Scheme in this article.

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