Impossible differential attacks on 4-round DES-like ciphers

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Abstract—Data Encryption Standard was a main public encryption standard for more than 20 years, but now it is considered insecure. However, there are still numerous proposals of new lightweight cipher designs similar to DES, some of them only consisting of 4 Feistel rounds. It is known that there exist generic distinguishers for 4-round Feistel cipher, but their complexity scales exponentially with the cipher size. In the theoretical analysis, an ideal round function is considered. In this article we focus on a model of Feistel ciphers with design similar to DES. The round function consists of bit expansion, S-box application, and permutation of bits. We show that practical DES-like designs cannot have only 4-rounds, even if the S-boxes are key-dependent, due to the impossible differential attacks.

Keywords—Feistel cipher, cryptanalysis, DES.

I. INTRODUCTION

Data Encryption Standard (DES) [4] was a public symmetric encryption standard for more than 20 years. Now it is considered insecure due to short 56-bit keys and only 64-bit block size, and due to linear [11] and differential [2] attacks. It was replaced by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [12], but in many legacy applications it is still in use, either in the original form, or as TDEA, known also as Triple DES.

Many applications in the areas of mobile computing, e-health services, wireless sensor networks, etc. require a simple way to secure communication channels. AES, as a current symmetric encryption standard provides robust and secure encryption. Its nice mathematical description provides alternative variants that can be adapted where public standard is not suitable [5]. However, AES and its variants can be too complex and costly for some applications, e.g., when only 80-bit security is required. The balancing issues between cipher security and implementation costs are the main object of study of the lightweight cryptography. Lightweight cryptography focuses on a simple cipher designs that provides enough security with lower costs in hardware or software implementations.

The question of general lower bounds on implementation of ciphers with given security criteria is an open problem, although some results are known for specific types of Boolean functions that are important building blocks of the ciphers [6]. Thus, design of lightweight ciphers is mostly influenced by the known standard cipher designs, including the DES. There are many promising lightweight variants of DES such as DESL [9].

In [13], an extremely lightweight version of DES is proposed with only 4 rounds of Feistel encryption. It is already known that such a design is insecure from the theoretical point of view [14], due to collision attacks. However, the complexity of these attacks is $O(2^{n/4})$, where $n$ is the block size. Thus, it might seem that problems with 4-round DES-like cipher can be avoided by large enough block size. In this paper we show a practical key-reconstruction attack on generalized 4-round DES-like cipher. Its complexity depends on the S-box size and expansion factor, both of which cannot be increased too much (due to implementation constraints). This leads to a conclusion that 4-round DES-like cipher constructions are inherently insecure and should not be used in practice.

II. PRELIMINARIES

In this section we summarize basic notations and definitions. First, we introduce the DES-like ciphers as a generalization of the design of the original Data Encryption Standard. Then we provide basic preliminaries on differential cryptanalysis and impossible differential attacks.

A. DES-like ciphers

Let $e : Z_2^{n_b} \times Z_2^{n_k} \rightarrow Z_2^{n_c}$ be a block cipher operating on $n_b$-bit blocks and having $n_k$ bit key. We construct function $e$ as a composition of partial functions that denote the individual steps of the encryption algorithm.

We call $e$ a generalized DES cipher, if it has a Feistel structure, and its round function consists of bit expansion, key addition, S-box evaluation and bit permutation layers. A cipher with Feistel structure works as follows:

1. Split the input string into left and right half,
2. Transform right part with a (key-dependent) round function $F$ and XOR it into the left part,
3. Swap the two parts.

This is repeated $r$ times, where each repetition of this process will be denoted as a round (of encryption).

Mathematically, let $x = (l \mid r)$ denote the input string.
Then \( y = (r | l \oplus F_r(r)) \) is an output string of one Feistel round (\( \oplus \) denotes XOR operation on bit strings).

Let \( n_b = 2m \) for some positive integer \( m \), and let \( n \geq m \), and let \( s \) be an integer that divides both \( m \), and \( n \). Let \( KS : Z_2^{nk} \rightarrow (Z_2^n)^r \) denote a key schedule algorithm. This algorithm provides \( r \) subkeys \( k^1, k^2, \ldots, k^r \) given a master key \( k \). I.e., \( KS(k) = (k^1, k^2, \ldots, k^r) \). Subkeys are used to define key dependent round functions for Feistel cipher.

Let \( \sigma_j : Z_2^{n/s} \times Z_2^{m/s} \) denote any Boolean function. We define S-box layer (containing \( s \) parallel S-boxes) as a function \( S : Z_2^n \times Z_2^n \), where

\[
S(x_0, \ldots, x_{n/s-1}, x_{n/s}, \ldots, x_{n-1}) =
(\sigma_1(x_0, \ldots, x_{n/s-1}), \ldots, \sigma_s(x_{n/s}, \ldots, x_{n-1})).
\]

I.e., we apply \( s \) S-boxes in parallel on \((n/s)\)-bit substrings of the input, producing corresponding \((m/s)\)-bit substrings of the output.

Let \( \varepsilon : Z_n \rightarrow Z_m \), \( n > m \), such that for every \( y \in Z_m \), there is at least one \( x \in Z_n \) such that \( y = \varepsilon x \). Bit expansion function \( E : Z_2^m \times Z_2^n \) is defined as

\[
E(x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}) = (x_{\varepsilon(0)}, x_{\varepsilon(1)}, \ldots, x_{\varepsilon(n-1)}).
\]

This means that each input bit is copied into output bits (in any order), and some of the input bits can occur in the output multiple times (are duplicated, triplicated, etc.).

Let \( \pi : Z_m \rightarrow Z_m \) be a bijection. Bit permutation function \( P : Z_2^m \times Z_2^n \) is defined as

\[
E(x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}) = (x_{\pi(0)}, x_{\pi(1)}, \ldots, x_{\pi(n-1)}).
\]

This means that each input bit is copied into output bits in the order prescribed by permutation \( \pi \).

Round function \( F : Z_2^n \times Z_2^n \rightarrow Z_2^n \) of a generalized DES cipher can be written as

\[
F(x, k^r) = P(S(E(x) \oplus k^r)),
\]

where \( S : Z_2^n \times Z_2^m \) denotes the S-box layer, \( E : Z_2^m \times Z_2^n \) is the bit expansion, and \( P : Z_2^n \times Z_2^n \) is the bit permutation.

In non-mathematical terms, generalized DES is a Feistel cipher, with round function that first performs bit expansion (takes \( m \) input bits, and reorder/copies them to \( n \) output bits), XORs the expanded input with the round key, applies S-boxes in parallel, and finally mixes the output bits with bit permutation \( P \). It is schematically denoted in Figure 2.

### B. Differential cryptanalysis

Differential cryptanalysis was introduced by Biham and Shamir in 1991 [2]. They attack DES-like ciphers by studying the statistical distribution of differences during the encryption process. Classical differential cryptanalysis requires the knowledge of S-boxes to produce a statistical model of S-box differential response, i.e., the probability that a given change of S-box input produces a particular S-box output difference.

A good overview of the standard differential cryptanalysis is provided in [7]. The first step in the attack is the study of S-boxes. The attacker computes a differential profile of the S-box \( S : Z_2^n \times Z_2^n \) by computing probabilities

\[
p_{a,b} = 1/2^n | \{ x | S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus a) = b \} |
\]

for each \( a, b \neq 0 \). Here \( p_{a,b} \) is a probability that for a random input of the S-box and given input difference \( a \) the S-box produces output difference \( b \). The attacker examines the linear parts of the cipher (in DES-like cipher these are just expansions and bit permutations, and the Feistel scheme itself), and identifies differential trajectories. A differential trajectory is a path of some selected difference through the encryption scheme under condition that some specific input-output difference pairs are realized on S-boxes in this path. Multiplying differential probabilities gives a good estimate for the probability \( p_d \) that given input difference of the cipher causes the expected output difference (corresponding to the studied trajectory). If \( p_d \) is significantly higher than the probability that such an output difference can occur randomly, it can be exploited in the distinguishing attack, or even in key recovery attacks.

A traditional differential cryptanalysis requires the knowledge of S-boxes and the structure of the cipher to compute the differential profiles and to search for suitable differential trajectories. When S-boxes are key dependent, or kept secret in other way, the standard techniques of differential cryptanalysis are thwarted (or at least they are not so straightforward). Still, in the later section we will show that in generalized DES we can adapt a method of impossible differentials [3], in a way that does not require the knowledge of concrete S-boxes.

Impossible differential cryptanalysis is based on those differences which have zero probability to occur. In this case we do not work with individual trajectories and differences, but instead focus on the sets of differences. The attacker must identify a large set of impossible differences. E.g., suppose that some specific input difference can only change the even number of bits in the output. Then every output difference with odd Hamming weight becomes impossible, and the set of all output differences with odd Hamming weight becomes a set of impossible differences. This creates a distinguisher for the cipher, because in ideal case (a random permutation) half of the differences can have odd Hamming weight.

It is generally more difficult to identify impossible
III. IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK ON 4-ROUND DES-LIKE CIPHER

In this section we apply the impossible differential attack to the generalized DES-like cipher. An attacker starts by encrypting two plaintext pairs, which have a suitably selected single-bit difference. By studying the propagation of this difference in the Feistel scheme, and in the round function, the attacker can efficiently characterize a large set of impossible output differences from the third round of the scheme. This set of impossible differences can then be used to eliminate wrong (partial) key hypotheses, and to reduce the keyspace in an efficient way (as long as the size of the S-box is small).

A. Difference propagation on the Feistel scheme level

Let us study the response of Feistel cipher to a single bit change in the left half of input. The situation is depicted in Figure 1. First we encrypt any plaintext \((x_L, x_R)\), getting ciphertext \((y_L, y_R)\). The attacker chooses a single bit difference \(\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_2\), i.e., \(w_H(\delta) = 1\). He then encrypts the plaintext \((x_L \oplus \delta, x_R)\), obtaining ciphertext \((y_L^*, y_R^*) = (y_L \oplus d_L, y_R \oplus d_R)\).

A good cipher should provide a strong avalanche effect, i.e., the output differences \(d_L\) and \(d_R\) should be unpredictable (with approximately one half of bits equal to zero, and one half equal to one).

If we study the encryption in more detail, we can see that in the first round the input to round function \(F_{k_1}\) is the same in both encryptions \((x_R)\). Thus, the difference \(\delta\) is unchanged, and is only swapped to the right side (and zero difference is swapped to the left side). In the second round the input to function \(F_{k_2}\) is different during the two encryptions, it differs exactly by the difference \(\delta\). If we do not know more details about the structure of \(F\), we cannot predict how will the outputs of \(F_{k_2}\) differ. We will denote the output difference in this second round \(\Delta\). The difference \(\Delta\) gets swapped to the left side, and the difference \(\delta\) back to the left side. In the third round the input difference to \(F_{k_3}\) is \(\Delta\), which is unknown, thus we do not know the output difference of \(F_{k_3}\) as well. However, we know that \(\Delta\) on right side is unchanged and gets swapped to the left side. In the fourth round difference \(\Delta\) is further changed by the output difference of \(F_{k_4}\).

Once the attacker obtains the ciphertexts and learns differences \(d_L\), and \(d_R\), he can propagate them backwards. Difference \(d_L\) is exactly the input difference of \(F_{k_4}\), and we can see that \(d_L \oplus d_3\) is the output difference of \(F_{k_4}\).
Difference $d_R$ is the XOR sum of $\Delta$ and the output difference of $F_{k_4}$. Thus, if the attacker somehow knows subkey $k_4$, he can compute $\Delta$ in the following way:

$$\Delta = d_R \oplus F_{k_4}(y_L^*) \oplus F_{k_4}(y_L^*).$$

The difference $\Delta$ is an output difference of $F_{k_4}$ provided a single bit input difference $\delta$. If $F$ has a DES-like structure described in Section 2, only some of differences $\Delta$ are possible. Let us denote a set of impossible differences $\Delta$ by $\mathcal{R}$, i.e.,

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \Delta; Pr_X\left(F_{k_4}(X) \oplus F_{k_4}(X \oplus \delta) = \Delta \right) = 0 \right\}.$$

Given two P-C pairs $((x_L, x_R), (y_L, y_R))$, and $((x_L^{\oplus \delta}, x_R), (y_L^{\oplus \delta}, y_R^{\oplus \delta}))$, attacker can use set $\mathcal{R}$ to quickly discard some of the potential subkeys used in the last round. The attacker chooses subkey value $k_4$, and computes

$$\Delta_T = d_R \oplus F_{k_4}(y_L^{\oplus \delta}) \oplus F_{k_4}(y_L^*).$$

If $k_4 = k_4$, $\Delta_T$ cannot belong to set $\mathcal{R}$, otherwise there is a chance proportional to $R/2^m$ that $\Delta_T$ belong to $\mathcal{R}$. Thus, if $\Delta_T \in \mathcal{R}$, the attacker immediately knows that $k_4 \neq k_4$. This allows the attacker quick computation of the last subkey, which is an efficient attack on cipher if the subkey leaks information about the key, and if the subkey is not longer than the full cipher key. However, if the cipher has DES-like cipher, we can do much better by studying the structure of function $F$ in more details.

B. Impossible differentials in a round function

First, let us consider how the set $\mathcal{R}$ is constructed. The attacker chooses a single bit difference $\delta$. Let us suppose that the bit which is changed has index $i$. The expansion function $E$ propagates the change to all positions $j$ such that $\varepsilon(j) = i$. The only S-boxes that are influenced by the change are those, where the change is propagated to. We call these S-boxes active, and other S-boxes inactive.

Suppose that $a = \min \left| \{ j; \varepsilon(j) = i \} \right|$. The attacker will choose $i$ in such a way that he gets at most $a$ active S-boxes (and $s-a$ inactive S-boxes). When S-box is inactive, its inputs do not change between encryptions. This means that also its outputs do not change. The output difference of inactive S-box can only contain zero bits. On the other hand, the output difference bits of the active S-box can be various different bitstrings. If an S-box is known, attacker can restrict the set of possible output differences by analyzing the set of output differences for a given input difference $\Delta$, i.e., $\{S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \Delta)\}$. In the worst-case scenario from the attacker’s point of view, the S-box is unknown. Still, the attacker can consider that any non-zero bit string is a possible output difference from an active S-box.

In this harder case, when the attacker does not know the S-boxes, we cannot, and do not need to, model the distribution of output differences from active S-boxes. Still, due to the presence of inactive S-boxes, we can be certain that the number of non-zero bits in difference is at most $a \cdot m/s$ (out of possible $m$ bits).

In the last step of the round function, the known zero-difference bits from the output of inactive S-boxes are further distributed by permutation function $P$. A difference $\Delta$, which has non-zero bit in a position that is an output of inactive S-box after permutation $P$ is impossible difference for the whole round function. If permutation $P$ is secret, the attacker still knows the minimal number of zero bits that any output difference can have. The scenario with secret $P$ is however unlikely, as it can be easy to extract hidden wiring from hardware implementations, and it is much more difficult to implement key-dependent bit set of permutations than a single fixed permutation.

Let us suppose that $E$, and $P$ are known, and S-boxes can remain hidden from the attacker. The attacker can characterize the set $\mathcal{R}$ by associating it with a bit mask $\mu$, which has 0 in those positions that correspond to outputs of active S-box permuted by $P$, and 1 in a positions corresponding to per muted outputs of inactive S-boxes. The attacker can quickly test whether $\Delta \in \mathcal{R} :$ compute bitwise AND between $\Delta$ and $\mu$. If it is non-zero, the difference $\Delta$ is impossible. Moreover, the attacker can test $\Delta$ in parts: compute bitwise AND just between a selected bits of $\Delta$ and corresponding bits of $\mu$. The non-zero result immediately
tells us that difference $\Delta$ is impossible, regardless of the rest of the bits that were not tested.

Let us provide a small example. The simplified situation is denoted in Figure 2. The input difference $\delta = 0000100000000000$ is expanded by $E$ into difference $0000010010000000000000$. This difference changes the inputs of the first two S-boxes, which become active S-boxes. The remaining two S-boxes are inactive. The bits of output difference corresponding to outputs of active S-boxes can potentially have both zero and non-zero value, denoted by "*" in the picture. The output differences are distributed by permutation $P$. Depending on the key, and on the actual inputs, we can observe any output difference in the form $**00 *0*0 *0*0 *0**$. For the attack, we characterize the impossible differential set by the bit mask $\mu = 1100110010101001$.

C. Key extraction attack

Once we compute the mask $\mu$, we can focus on the attack on the last round subkey. We want to find all values of $k_T$ that do not lead to impossible differentials. We do not need to compute the whole output of $F_{k_T}$ to discard some key, it suffices to find some part of $\Delta_T$ that can be compared with mask $\mu$ and discarded. Key $k_T$ is XOR-ed to expanded input $y_L$, and $y'_L$, respectively, before computing the output of S-boxes. Thus, to compute the $m/s$ bits of $\Delta_T$, we only need to guess $n/s$ bits of $k_T$, and the contents of a single S-box. If the S-box is key-dependent, we guess the corresponding key bits that are used to generate the S-boxes. After computing the corresponding $m/s$ bits of the difference $\Delta_T$, we check it with the corresponding part of the mask $\mu$. If the difference $\Delta_T$ is impossible, we know that the key guess was incorrect.

We can separate the search for a correct subkey and S boxes: Just work with a single hypothesis for S-boxes, and try to find the correct subkey. If the S-box hypothesis is incorrect, the impossible differentials will eliminate all subkeys, otherwise a correct subkey will remain (and S-boxes are found).

For each part of the key, we test only $2^{n/s}$ hypotheses separately, for a total work of $s2^{n/s}$, instead of $2^n$ tests, which is an exponential speedup. E.g. for classical DES, $n = 48$, and to find the subkey using a whole $\Delta_T$, we would need $2^{48} \approx 3 \cdot 10^{14}$ tests. If we test 4-bit blocks of $\Delta_T$ separately, we only need $8 \cdot 2^8 = 512$ tests. To prevent this attack, we would need to significantly increase the value $n/s$. However, the size of S-boxes is also exponential in $n/s$, thus it is not possible to increase the size due to implementation constraints.

A single set of two P-C pairs $((x_L, x_R), (y_L, y_R))$, and $((x'_L \oplus \delta, x'_R), (y'_L, y'_R))$ provides only a partial reduction in possible key space. Suppose that we test 4-bit blocks ($m/s = 4$). If the corresponding part of mask $\mu$ is 0000, we cannot eliminate any key hypothesis. We try to avoid such blocks, or to test two or more blocks together in such a case (so that the corresponding mask does not contain only zeros). If the corresponding mask has a single bit equal to one, we can eliminate approximately half of hypotheses. If the mask has all ones, only approximately 1 out of 16 hypotheses is not eliminated. Furthermore, the attacker can provide different sets of input P-C pairs, each of which will eliminate a fraction of remaining key hypotheses, until at most one will remain. The number of required sets of P-C pairs is logarithmic in the key space (comparable to $n/s$, instead of $2^{n/s}$). Thus the attack has very low complexity even for ciphers with large blocks and key sizes.

After the attack on the last round is successful, we can either reconstruct the original key (depending on the key schedule), or adapt the attack to a simpler 3-round structure.

IV. Conclusions

The famous results of Luby and Rackoff [10] show that using Feistel construction one can transform a pseudorandom function into a pseudorandom permutation with three round Feistel cipher. These results were further extended to 4-round Feistel constructions and further by Patarin [14]. This does not however mean, that it is possible to use just 4-round Feistel scheme to construct a secure cipher, such as proposed in [13], due to a requirement that the round function is already an ideal pseudorandom function.

In this article we study the improbable differential attacks on 4-round DES-like cipher. We show that it is possible to mount a key recovery attack on such a cipher with complexity scaling with the size of the S-box, instead of with the block size. The attacker uses a slow diffusion of the Feistel scheme, and a limited local diffusion of a single round. The attack can work without the knowledge of the S-boxes, but can be made more efficient, if the S-boxes are known.

It can be concluded that similar designs are inherently insecure and should not be used in applications that require secure communication. Still, the 4-round construction has relatively good avalanche, thus it might be possible to use it in place where only avalanche effect and not strong security is required, e.g., in steganographic systems [8].

It is possible to strengthen the cipher by increasing the number of rounds, but it is not clear how many rounds are required to provide enough resistance against more sophisticated attacks than the one presented in this paper. To study more advanced attacks, graph techniques, similar to [6] can be adapted to search for improbable differential sets.

From the security point of view, the best recommendation is
to use standard ciphers, such as AES [12] instead of custom
designs, and try to conserve resources in other parts of the
system. Alternatively, it is possible to consider replacing block
cipher with a fast and simple stream cipher [1] (see also [15]
for stream cipher overview).

REFERENCES